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AFFORDING THE FRANCHISE: AMENDMENT 4 & THE SENATE 
BILL 7066 LITIGATION 
Dalia Figueredo* 
Abstract 
Felon re-enfranchisement statutes that condition the restoration of 
voting rights on the payment of legal financial obligations have been 
challenged under the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the 
U.S. Constitution. To date, these challenges have been unsuccessful 
because felons are not a protected class, disenfranchised felons do not 
have a fundamental right to vote under existing case law, and these 
financial obligations have not been categorized as unconstitutional poll 
taxes. The most recent struggle to defeat a discriminatory felon re-
enfranchisement statute is in Florida, where different advocacy groups 
are attempting to defend the integrity of Amendment 4, the Voting Rights 
Restoration Amendment. Amendment 4 promised to automatically 
restore the voting rights of returning citizens (persons convicted of 
felonies) upon the completion of their sentence, including probation and 
parole. After Floridians overwhelmingly approved Amendment 4 in 
2018, the Florida legislature passed Senate Bill 7066 (SB 7066), a statute 
defining the completion of sentence as encompassing the full payment of 
all court costs, fees, fines, and restitution. This Comment explores prior 
legal challenges to financially discriminatory re-enfranchisement 
schemes and the ongoing litigation over Amendment 4 and SB 7066. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Felon disenfranchisement is not a new phenomenon. The practice 
dates back to the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment,1 and there is 
historical support for penal disenfranchisement in the colonial era.2 
However, felon disenfranchisement is inextricably tied to the United 
States history of racial discrimination.3 Scholars have shown that 
legislatures added many felon disenfranchisement provisions to state 
constitutions in the post-Civil War era as a means to disenfranchise 
former slaves who had been granted the right to vote under the 
Reconstruction Amendments.4  
Accordingly, the practice is also closely linked to the sabotage of 
democratic advancements and the expansion of the franchise. Today, 
most states engage in at least partial disenfranchisement,5 limiting 
peoples’ ability to vote while they are incarcerated or under supervision.6 
In fact, Maine and Virginia are the only two states that do not restrict the 
voting rights of persons convicted of felonies, including prisoners.7 
Eleven states indefinitely disenfranchise at least some persons with 
felony convictions.8 Until 2018, Florida was one of four states whose 
constitution indefinitely disenfranchised persons with felony 
convictions.9  
 
 1. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 48 (1974) (“[A]t the time of the adoption of 
the [Fourteenth] Amendment, 29 States had provisions in their constitutions which prohibited, or 
authorized the legislature to prohibit, exercise of the franchise by persons convicted of felonies or 
infamous crimes.”). 
 2. See Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1061. 
 3. See, e.g., Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the “Menace of Negro 
Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 
AM. J. SOC. 559, 564 (2003) (noting that many states adopted disenfranchisement provisions in 
the 1860s and 1870s, following the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments). 
 4. Id. at 565. 
 5. JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER 1 
tbl.1 (2019). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 2. 
 8. Id. at 1–2.  
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On November 6, 2018, a majority10 of Floridians passed Amendment 
4, a citizens’ initiative11 that provided for automatic restoration of voting 
rights for convicted felons who completed their sentences (returning 
citizens).12 Proponents of Amendment 4 estimated that the initiative 
would restore the voting rights of up to 1.4 million people.13 Prior to the 
passage of Amendment 4, the Florida Constitution permanently 
disenfranchised returning citizens, unless they were granted restoration 
of their civil rights by the clemency board, which is made up of the 
governor and two members of the cabinet.14 Under the Florida Rules of 
Executive Clemency, returning citizens had to wait five to seven years 
after the end of their sentence and supervision before applying to restore 
their civil rights.15 Under Governor Rick Scott’s eight-year tenure, the 
clemency board met only four times per year16 and restored the civil 
rights of approximately 3,000 people.17 
The passage of Amendment 4 seemed to be a resounding victory for 
voting rights, but during the spring 2019 legislative session, the Florida 
state legislature passed SB 7066.18 The legislature enacted SB 7066 as 
“implementing language” to clarify the meaning of certain provisions of 
 
 10. Samantha J. Gross, Florida Voters Approve Amendment 4 on Restoring Felons’ Voting 
Rights, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 6, 2018, 9:18 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-
government/election/article220678880.html [https://perma.cc/KYQ4-P2CT]. 
 11. An initiative is “[a]n electoral process by which a percentage of voters can propose 
legislation and compel a vote on it by the legislature or by the full electorate. Recognized in some 
state constitutions, the initiative is one of the few methods of direct democracy in an otherwise 
representative system.” Initiative, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 12. To read the full text and ballot summary of Amendment 4, see Voter Restoration 
Amendment Text, ACLU FLA. (2020), https://www.aclufl.org/en/voter-restoration-amendment-
text [https://perma.cc/R27Q-KPHU].  
 13. Frances Robles, 1.4 Floridians with Felonies Win Long-Denied Right to Vote, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html 
[https://perma.cc/U5BU-U55V]. 
 14. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 8(a) (1998), invalidated by Hand v. Scott, 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244 
(N.D. Fla. 2018), vacated sub nom. Hand v. DeSantis, 946 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2020).  
 15. FLA. R. EXEC. CLEMENCY 9(A), 10(A). Restoration of civil rights includes the right to 
serve on juries and run for public office. Cf. id. (excluding only the right “to own, possess, or use” 
firearms from the civil rights that may be restored by the Clemency Board). 
 16. Greg Allen, Felons in Florida Want Their Voting Rights Back Without a Hassle, NPR 
(July 5, 2018, 7:23 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/07/05/625671186/felons-in-florida-want-
their-voting-rights-back-without-a-hassle [https://perma.cc/B8GE-2GT3]. 
 17. MORGAN MCLEOD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: TWO DECADES 
OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM 7 (2018). In comparison, Governor Scott’s 
predecessor, Governor Charlie Christ, restored voting rights for over 150,000 people during his 
four years in office. Id.    
 18. CS/SB 7066: Election Administration, FLA. SENATE, https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/ 
Bill/2019/07066 [https://perma.cc/33ZX-9UBZ]. 
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Amendment 4.19 Most notably, SB 7066 defines “terms of a sentence” 
not merely as the term of imprisonment and supervision, but also as the 
payment of all fines, fees, restitution, and court costs the judge imposed 
at the time of sentencing.20 SB 7066 requires returning citizens to pay all 
legal financial obligations (LFOs) before becoming eligible for automatic 
restoration of their voting rights.21 
Since its introduction, commentators have criticized SB 7066 as a 
subversion of Amendment 4’s purpose.22 Despite these criticisms, the 
legislature passed SB 7066 on May 3, 2019,23 and Governor Ron 
DeSantis signed the bill into law on June 28, 2019.24 Almost immediately, 
several advocacy groups filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Florida, challenging the constitutionality of SB 
7066.25  
The passage of Amendment 4 and its subsequent demise by the 
Florida legislature offer two lessons. First, legislators are willing to 
subvert the popular will through so-called implementing legislation.26 
 
 19. George Bennet, DeSantis to Act Quickly on Water, Supreme Court, Broward Sheriff, 
PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 12, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/20181212/ 
exclusive-desantis-to-act-quickly-on-water-supreme-court-broward-sheriff [https://perma.cc/7L 
7G-6F8V]. 
 20. The statute’s exact language requires returning citizens to complete “any portion of a 
sentence that is contained in the four corners of the sentencing document.” FLA. STAT. 
§ 98.0751(2)(a) (2019). This includes the payment of fees, fines, costs, and restitution a court 
orders at the time of sentencing or as a condition of supervision. Id. 
 21. Id. § 98.0751(1), (2). Returning citizens could also satisfy payment of their LFOs by 
getting consent from the victim to terminate their obligation to pay restitution if they owe any; 
converting their LFOs into community service and completing the hours; or convincing the court 
to waive their LFOs. Id. § 98.0751(2)(e). 
 22. See, e.g., Jesse L. Jackson Sr. & David Daley, Don’t Turn the Clock Back on Voting 
Rights, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 31, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/03/ 
31/don-turn-clock-back-voting-rights/dneM1qaygyn4uJ9fGQPkTK/story.html [https://perma.cc/ 
RH6Z-5XDU]; Mark Joseph Stern, Florida Republicans Are Sabotaging a Constitutional 
Amendment that Gives Felons the Right to Vote, SLATE (Mar. 20, 2019, 4:33 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/03/florida-republicans-felon-voting-rights-amendment-
4.html [https://perma.cc/3AAS-TLJ3]; Orlando Sentinel Editorial Bd., The Unfolding Sabotage 
of Amendment 4 and Voting Rights, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 19, 2019, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/opinion/editorials/os-op-amendment-4-legislature-sabotage-
voting-rights-20190319-story.html [https://perma.cc/P3DX-Y2KH].  
 23. CS/SB 7066: Election Administration, supra note 18.   
 24. Dara Kam, Gov. Ron DeSantis Signs Florida Election Bill; Groups Sue over Voting 
Rights, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (June 28, 2019, 9:00 PM), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/ 
news/2019/06/28/desantis-signs-election-bill-groups-sue-over-voting-rights/1602545001/ [https: 
//perma.cc/XA7T-U2QU]. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Ironically, Florida legislators say they relied on statements Jon Mills, a co-author of 
Amendment 4, made to support their understanding of the phrase “all terms of . . . sentence.” 
Daniel Rivero, Co-Author and Attorney for Florida’s Amendment 4 Helped Create Statewide 
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Indeed, this is not the first time that the Florida legislature has 
undermined the purpose of a popular citizens’ initiative. In 2016, 
Floridians passed Amendment 2, which created Florida’s medical 
marijuana program.27 Following its passage, the Florida legislature 
passed a statute prohibiting people from smoking medical marijuana.28 
As a result, the implementation of Amendment 2 was substantially 
delayed until 2019, when the Florida legislature and Governor Ron 
DeSantis repealed the ban on smoking medical marijuana.29  
Second, the Amendment 4 debacle demonstrates that at least some 
state legislators will attempt to maintain felon disenfranchisement 
provisions in practice, if not in name, through discriminatory re-
enfranchisement schemes. The practical effect of forcing returning 
citizens to pay their LFOs before restoring their voting rights is that some 
returning citizens will never regain their right to vote.   
I.  FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO RE-ENFRANCHISEMENT PRE-SB 7066 
Like felon disenfranchisement provisions, felon re-enfranchisement 
laws that condition the restoration of voting rights on the payment of 
LFOs are not new. In the past, litigants have challenged these laws under 
both the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution.30 However, before the passage of SB 7066 and the litigation 
challenging its constitutionality, these challenges were unsuccessful 
 
Fines and Fees Policy, WLRN (Mar. 27, 2019), https://www.wlrn.org/post/co-author-and-
attorney-floridas-amendment-4-helped-create-statewide-fines-and-fees-policy#stream/0 [https:// 
perma.cc/S483-PRJ5]. During a hearing in the Florida Supreme Court on the language of 
Amendment 4, Justice Ricky Polston asked Mills if “sentence” included “the full payment of any 
fines.” Id. Mills responded, “All terms means all terms.” Id.  
 27. Summary of Florida’s Amendment 2, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (2020), 
https://www.mpp.org/states/florida/amendment2/ [https://perma.cc/282W-K36Y]. 
 28. Senate Bill 8-A excluded “marijuana in a form for smoking” as a “medical use” of 
marijuana. S.B. 8-A, 2017 Leg., Spec. Sess. (Fla. 2017). 
 29. John Morgan was one of several parties to file suit against Florida, “[a]rguing that 
Florida legislators violated voters’ intent when they prohibited smoking for the medical use of 
marijuana.” Mary Ellen Klas, John Morgan Sues State for Blocking the Smoking of Medical 
Marijuana, MIAMI HERALD (July 6, 2017, 8:10 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/ 
politics-government/state-politics/article159856784.html [https://perma.cc/FD9T-8EJJ]. In 2019, 
the Florida legislature and Governor Ron DeSantis repealed the ban on smoking medical 
marijuana. Casey Leins, Smokable Medical Marijuana Now Legal in Florida, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Mar. 19, 2019), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/articles/2019-03-19/ 
florida-gov-ron-desantis-signs-bill-lifting-ban-on-smokable-medical-marijuana [https://perma.cc 
/XM6G-5CAG]. 
 30. Felon disenfranchisement in general has also been challenged on various constitutional 
grounds. See, e.g., Janai S. Nelson, The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon 
Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA. L. REV. 111, 115 (2013) (challenging felon 
disenfranchisement as viewpoint discrimination).  
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because courts were unwilling to accept claims that such re-
enfranchisement schemes violate equal protection, abridge the 
fundamental right to vote, or constitute impermissible poll taxes.  
A.  Fourteenth Amendment  
The failure of prior Fourteenth Amendment challenges to statutes that 
condition the restoration of voting rights on the payment of LFOs is due, 
at least in part, to the odd intersection at which these claims lie. These 
claims seemingly deal with a simple premise: re-enfranchisement statutes 
that require the payment of LFOs constitute wealth discrimination and 
abridge the fundamental right to vote. However, government 
classifications relating to wealth are generally constitutional if they 
rationally relate to a legitimate government interest. Furthermore, due to 
the plaintiffs’ status as former felons and the existing case law on felon 
disenfranchisement, substantive due process arguments relating to the 
right to vote have been wholly unsuccessful.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that legislation and government 
action that classifies persons on the basis of wealth only require rational 
basis review.31 Under this standard, the government must show that the 
classification rationally relates to a legitimate governmental purpose.32 
Unless the wealth classification targets a suspect class33 or abridges a 
fundamental right, judicial scrutiny will not be heightened.34  
The Court has recognized that voting is a fundamental right.35 In 
Reynolds v. Sims,36 the Court considered an equal protection challenge to 
several legislative reapportionment37 plans.38 In striking down Alabama’s 
discriminatory reapportionment schemes, the majority stated that “the 
right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and [fair] society” and 
 
 31. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973). The Rodriguez 
plaintiffs alleged that the public school funding system, which relied on local property 
assessments, discriminated against students living in less affluent neighborhoods. Id. at 4–5, 28. 
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the funding system also abridged their fundamental right 
to education because their schools received less funding. Id. at 29.  
 32. See id. at 17, 55.  
 33. A suspect class has traditionally been “subjected to . . . a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process.” San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 
411 U.S. 1, 28 (1972). 
 34. See id. at 40. 
 35. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). 
 36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 37. Reapportionment refers to the “[r]ealignment of a legislative district’s boundaries to 
reflect changes in population and ensure proportionate representation by elected officials.” 
Reapportionment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 38. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536–37. 
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“any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully 
and meticulously scrutinized.”39  
Subsequently, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,40 the Court 
struck down Virginia’s $1.50 poll tax under the Equal Protection 
Clause,41 holding that a state may not make “the affluence of the voter or 
payment of any fee an electoral standard.”42 Following Harper, the Court 
continued to show skepticism over “[t]he use of the franchise to compel 
compliance with other, independent state objectives” and declared it 
“questionable in any context.”43  
Despite the Court’s broad proclamations against financial barriers to 
the franchise, neither Harper nor its progeny dealt with the voting rights 
of convicted persons or financial barriers to the restoration of voting 
rights. Instead, courts have decided these issues under a line of cases that 
present a much less expansive view of the fundamental right to vote.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that disenfranchised felons do not 
have a fundamental right to vote.44 In Richardson v. Ramirez,45 the Court 
held that felon disenfranchisement did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly 
allows disenfranchisement as punishment for a crime.46 Because the 
Court has ruled that disenfranchised felons do not have a fundamental 
right to vote, courts typically apply rational basis review for 
classifications relating to felon disenfranchisement.47 Courts have 
decided prior challenges to felon re-enfranchisement schemes relating to 
the payment of LFOs under Richardson and its progeny. Each time, 
courts have subjected these re-enfranchisement schemes to rational basis 
review and found them constitutional.48  
 
 39. Id. at 561–62.  
 40. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).  
 41. See id. at 670.  
 42. Id. at 666. 
 43. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289, 299 (1975) (emphasis added) (invalidating a Texas law 
requiring persons to own property to vote in a local election and rejecting the state’s interest in 
encouraging compliance with tax laws). 
 44. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974). 
 45. 418 U.S. 24 (1974).  
 46. Id. at 54.  
 47. See, e.g., Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he right of convicted 
felons to vote is not ‘fundamental’. . . . It follows that the standard of equal protection scrutiny to 
be applied when the state makes classifications relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the 
traditional rational basis standard.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1115 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(“[Felon disenfranchisement] laws must bear a rational relationship to the achieving of a 
legitimate state interest.”).  
 48. See, e.g., Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bredesen, 
624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 769 (Wash. 2007).   
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The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have both 
weighed in on the proper standard of review for felon re-enfranchisement 
statutes that require the full payment of LFOs.49 Both circuit courts have 
refused to apply strict scrutiny50 despite the plaintiffs’ insistence that 
these schemes abridge their fundamental right to vote51 or discriminate 
on the basis of wealth.52 Instead, both circuit courts have subjected the 
respective schemes to rational basis review.53 Under the deferential 
standard of rational basis review, the circuit courts held that a state could 
“rationally conclude that only those who have satisfied their debts to 
society . . . are entitled to restoration of their voting rights.”54  
At the state level, the Washington Supreme Court sustained a similar 
re-enfranchisement statute under both the state and federal constitutions 
in Madison v. State.55 Like the federal courts, the Washington Supreme 
Court refused to subject the scheme to strict scrutiny.56 However, in its 
analysis under the state constitution, the court did consider whether to 
apply intermediate scrutiny.57 Under Washington precedent, if the 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that legislation or government action affect an 
“important right” or target a semi-suspect class, courts will apply 
intermediate scrutiny.58 However, the court held that the plaintiffs did not 
meet their burden in demonstrating that felons’ right to vote was an 
important right.59 The court also concluded that the statute did not 
“classify based on wealth” but rather on plaintiffs’ status as former 
felons.60 
Prior to the passage of Amendment 4 and the SB 7066 litigation, 
plaintiffs challenged Florida’s previous re-enfranchisement scheme61 on 
wealth discrimination grounds under the Equal Protection Clause. In 
Johnson v. Bush,62 the plaintiffs argued that conditioning the restoration 
of civil rights on the payment of restitution discriminated against 
 
 49. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079, 1081. 
 50. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079. 
 51. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079. 
 52. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1071, 1078. 
 53. See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 746; Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079, 1081. 
 54. Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1079; see also Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 747 (“[T]he state’s interests 
of encouraging . . . compliance with court orders, and requiring felons to complete their entire 
sentences . . . supply a rational basis . . . .”). 
 55. 163 P.3d 757 (Wash. 2007).  
 56. Id. at 769. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. (quoting In re Runyan, 853 P.2d 424, 433 (1993)). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.  
 62. 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 
F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 
346489-FLR_72-5_Text.indd   198 9/29/20   7:36 AM
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 72, Iss. 5 [], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol72/iss5/4
2020] AFFORDING THE FRANCHISE 1143 
 
returning citizens lacking financial resources.63 However, on appeal, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “Florida’s 
Rules of Executive Clemency do not deny access to the franchise to those 
too poor to pay restitution”64 because the Rules provide a waiver for 
restitution.65 Sitting en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that “Florida 
does not deny access to the restoration of the franchise based on an ability 
to pay,”66 presumably relying on the waiver for payment of restitution. 
Thus, prior to the passage of SB 7066, the Eleventh Circuit did not weigh 
in on the proper standard of review in cases concerning felon re-
enfranchisement schemes that denied returning citizens access to voting 
based on their inability to pay LFOs.67  
B.  Twenty-Fourth Amendment 
Most of the plaintiffs who challenged states’ re-enfranchisement 
schemes under the Equal Protection Clause also argued that the LFOs 
functioned as poll taxes. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment bans the use of 
a “poll tax or other tax” to deny or abridge the franchise.68 Unlike a wealth 
discrimination analysis, poll tax jurisprudence does not rely on levels of 
scrutiny but rather turns on whether a payment or fee can be characterized 
as a tax. In Harman v. Forssenius,69 the Court construed the phrase “poll 
tax or other tax” broadly when it invalidated a Virginia law requiring 
voters to pay a poll tax or submit a certificate of residence.70 The Court 
emphasized that the Twenty-Fourth Amendment “‘nullifies sophisticated 
as well as simple-minded modes’ of impairing the right” to vote.71 
Harman highlights that the definition of tax is neither rigid nor exact. 
In the re-enfranchisement statute challenges, the poll tax argument 
has been largely unsuccessful. For example, the district court in Bredesen 
held that the financial requirement was not an unconstitutional poll tax 
 
 63. See id. at 1342. 
 64. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated, (11th Cir. 
2004) (en banc).   
 65. See Cherish M. Keller, Note, Re-Enfranchisement Laws Provide Unequal Treatment: 
Ex-Felon Re-Enfranchisement and the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 199, 222–
23 (2006). 
 66. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1216–17 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 67. See Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1331 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“Neither the 
U.S. Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to 
equal protection challenges to felon re-enfranchisement laws.”). 
 68.  U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 69.  380 U.S. 528 (1965). 
 70.  See id. at 531–33. 
 71.  Id. at 540–41 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)). 
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but rather a legal obligation arising from the plaintiffs’ sentences.72 In so 
holding, the court reasoned that “[i]mposing a requirement that convicted 
felons comply with . . . outstanding court orders [to pay LFOs] cannot 
reasonably be construed as a ‘tax’ on voting.”73 In Johnson, the district 
court came to a similar conclusion.74 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit 
declined to reach the poll tax issue.75  
Although the Sixth Circuit majority in Bredesen rejected the 
plaintiffs’ poll tax claim, Judge Karen Moore, in her dissenting opinion, 
argued that the payment of fines, fees, and certain forms of restitution 
could be characterized as an unconstitutional poll tax.76 The dissent 
adopted a broad definition of “tax”: money levied by the government for 
the support of the government or the general public.77 Judge Moore 
pointed out that the state levied an additional 5% from all child support 
payments, which the Tennessee statute required returning citizens to 
pay.78 Furthermore, in several instances, restitution payments went to the 
state or federal government and functioned essentially as taxes.79  
Despite these convincing points, prior to the SB 7066 litigation, no 
federal court has held that the payment of LFOs as a condition of voting 
rights restoration constitutes a poll tax or “other tax” under the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment.  
II.  THE SB 7066 LITIGATION 
The various opinions the SB 7066 litigation spawned have led to 
significant developments in the case law on financial barriers to felon re-
enfranchisement. In its order denying Florida’s motion to dismiss and 
granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the Northern 
District of Florida made it clear that Florida could not condition the 
restoration of returning citizens’ voting rights on their inability to pay 
 
 72.  See Johnson v. Bredesen, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1059 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“The victim restitution 
requirement is not a special fee that they must pay in order to exercise a right already existing in 
them, but a requirement made within the authority of the State to begin the process of having their 
civil rights fully restored.”), aff’d sub nom. Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 
2005) (en banc).  
 75. Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217 n.1 (“[W]e say nothing about whether conditioning an 
application for clemency on paying restitution would be an invalid poll tax.”).  
 76.  See Bredesen, 624 F.3d at 770 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 77.  Id. at 769. 
 78.  Id. at 770. 
 79.  See id. at 770–71. 
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LFOs.80 Although the court acknowledged that states may condition the 
restoration of voting rights on the satisfaction of at least some LFOs,81 it 
expressed doubts as to whether these financial restrictions would pass 
constitutional muster when applied to an individual who cannot pay.82  
The court’s analysis rested primarily on a footnote in Johnson v. 
Governor of Florida,83 where the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[a]ccess to 
the franchise cannot be made to depend on an individual’s financial 
resources.”84 Indeed, the only reason that the Eleventh Circuit approved 
Florida’s previous restoration scheme under the Florida Rules of 
Executive Clemency was “[b]ecause Florida [did] not deny access to the 
restoration of the franchise based on ability to pay”85 since the state 
provided waivers to returning citizens who could not afford to pay 
restitution.86  
The district court concluded that the Johnson footnote “establishes 
two things.”87 First, Florida cannot deny returning citizens the restoration 
of their voting rights solely because they “do[] not have the financial 
resources to pay restitution.”88 The court determined that the Johnson 
reasoning applies with equal force to other LFOs.89 Second, Florida will 
not offend the Constitution if it creates a process for demonstrably 
indigent returning citizens to obtain re-enfranchisement.90 To that end, 
Florida could “properly place the burden of establishing inability to pay 
on the [returning citizens] and . . . put in a place an appropriate 
administrative process.”91  
The district court observed that this “administrative process” could be 
integrated into the same six-step “process available to others whose right 
to vote has been restored under Amendment 4 and SB 7066.”92 That 
 
 80. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1301, 1304 (N.D. Fla. 2019), aff’d sub nom. 
Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).  
 81. Id. at 1300.  
 82. See id. (“The analysis to this point does not, however, resolve the claim based on 
inability to pay.”). 
 83. 405 F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
 84. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1301 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson, 405 F.3d at 
1216 n.1). 
 85. Id. at 1300 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Johnson, 405 F.3d at 1217 n.1). 
 86. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.  
 87. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1301. The court also dedicated a significant portion of the 
order to explaining why the Johnson footnote is controlling and not merely dicta. Id. Specifically, 
the court noted that the fact “[t]hat an issue is resolved in a footnote rather than in the text of an 
opinion makes no difference.” Id.  
 88. Id.   
 89. See id.  
 90. See id.  
 91. Id. at 1303.  
 92. Id. at 1303–04. 
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process is the existing voter registration and verification process that 
Supervisors of Election and the Florida Secretary of State already 
undertake to determine whether an individual is an eligible voter.93 At 
some point throughout this process, indigent returning citizens can be 
given the opportunity to either explain their inability to pay any 
disqualifying LFOs or contest the Secretary of State and Supervisor of 
Elections’ determination of ineligibility to register to vote through a 
hearing.94 This process, or any similar “constitutionally acceptable 
alternative method,”95 is available to the Florida legislature.96 
The district court emphasized that an accommodation for indigents is 
“consistent with a series of [U.S.] Supreme Court decisions,”97 relying 
primarily on M.L.B. v. S.L.J.98 and Harper. In M.L.B., the Court laid out 
two exceptions to “the ‘general rule’ that equal-protection claims based 
on indigency are subject to only rational-basis review.”99 The first 
exception relates to claims involving voting rights, and the second 
exception applies to “criminal or quasi-criminal processes.”100 The 
district court emphasized that the idea that “punishment cannot be 
increased because of a defendant’s inability to pay”101 applies with equal 
force to re-enfranchisement schemes.102  
Following the district court’s preliminary injunction order, the Florida 
Supreme Court weighed in on the meaning of Amendment 4 after 
Governor DeSantis asked the court for an advisory opinion.103 The 
Florida Supreme Court held that “the phrase [‘all terms of 
sentence’] . . . plainly refers to obligations and includes ‘all’—not 
some—LFOs imposed in conjunction with an adjudication of guilt.”104 
However, since the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
Amendment 4 is not dispositive of the constitutionality of SB 7066, the 
federal case proceeded.105  
 
 93. See id. at 1304.  
 94. See id.   
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id. at 1301. 
 98. 519 U.S. 102 (1996).  
 99. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d at 1302 (quoting M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 123). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  
 102. See id.  
 103. Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amendment 4, The Voting 
Restoration Amendment, 288 So. 3d 1070, 1072 (Fla. 2020).  
 104. Id. at 1075 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VI § 4(a)). 
 105. See Advisory Opinion to the Governor Re: Implementation of Amendment 4, the Voting 
Restoration Amendment, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.brennancenter 
.org/our-work/court-cases/advisory-opinion-governor-re-implementation-amendment-4-voting-
restoration [https://perma.cc/KB6F-DMJ4] (“The state court did not interpret the U.S. 
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Florida appealed the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ 
preliminary injunction.106 On January 28, 2020, a three-judge panel of 
Eleventh Circuit judges heard oral arguments.107 The panel seemed 
concerned with two questions: (1) determining the amount or proportion 
of returning citizens that SB 7066 would continue to disenfranchise 
because of their inability to pay,108 and (2) how Florida could determine 
who was unable to pay.109 Because Florida filed the appeal after only the 
order granting the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, the Eleventh Circuit 
did not have a substantial factual record to work from.  
Despite these unanswered questions, the Eleventh Circuit issued an 
opinion affirming the district court’s preliminary injunction on February 
19, 2020.110 In the opinion, the Eleventh Circuit explicitly disagreed with 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision on the appropriate standard of review for 
felon re-enfranchisements schemes that require payment of LFOs and 
disproportionately affect indigent returning citizens.111 Instead, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that “heightened scrutiny applies”112 in the SB 7066 
challenge, creating a split of authority between the circuit courts on the 
issue. Despite its focus on heightened scrutiny for the holding, the panel 
also expressed doubts as to SB 7066’s constitutionality under rational 
basis review.113 However, the court’s rational basis analysis distinguished 
between an as-applied challenge and a facial challenge to SB 7066.114 
While the court believed that the plaintiffs had successfully demonstrated 
their indigency,115 they failed to demonstrate that the “mine-run” of 
 
Constitution or federal law. It answers a narrow question of state law and does not alter the Florida 
legislature’s obligations to abide by the U.S. Constitution.”). The Brennan Center is one of many 
legal advocacy groups taking part in the Amendment 4/SB 7066 litigation. 
 106. Lawrence Mower, Gov. DeSantis Appeals Judge’s Order in Amendment 4 Lawsuit, 
TAMPA BAY TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/11/ 
15/gov-desantis-appeals-judges-order-in-amendment-4-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/32K8-XXL2]. 
 107. Lawrence Mower, Judges Challenge DeSantis Attorney About Fairness of Amendment 
4 Bill, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2020/ 
01/28/judges-challenge-desantis-attorney-about-fairness-of-amendment-4-bill/ [https://perma.cc/ 
8KW2-PPUP]. 




 109. Id. at 54:10. Senior Judge Stanley Marcus questioned how Florida could determine who 
was indigent without placing an “administrative burden” on the state. Id.  
 110. Jones v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 833 (11th Cir. 2020).  
 111. Id. at 808–09.  
 112. Id. at 809. 
 113. Id.  
 114. See id. at 810, 813. 
 115. See id. at 812. 
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returning citizens are indigent, making the LFO payment requirement 
“irrational as applied to the class as a whole.”116 Accordingly, the 
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court and the trial took 
place in late April.117  
On May 24, 2020, the district court finally struck down the “pay-to-
vote system”118 SB 7066 established. First, the court restated “[t]he 
Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Jones v. Governor of Florida: Florida’s 
pay-to-vote system, at least as applied to those unable to pay, is subject 
to heightened scrutiny.”119 Although Florida reiterated its interest in only 
re-enfranchising returning citizens who had fully completed their 
sentences at the trial, the district court opinion pointed out that the 
Eleventh Circuit had already rejected this stated interest as irrational 
when applied to those genuinely unable to pay.120  
As to the “mine-run” of returning citizens, the district court—relying 
on the expert testimony of Dr. Daniel A. Smith, a political scientist and 
professor at the University of Florida—concluded that the record now 
showed that the majority of individuals affected by SB 7066 are 
genuinely unable to pay their LFOs.121 Accordingly, SB 7066 failed to 
pass even rational basis scrutiny.122 
Aside from the equal protection violations, the district court also held 
that requiring returning citizens to pay certain LFOs—so-called fees and 
costs—violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment.123 The district court 
acknowledged that other courts that had addressed whether LFOs 
constitute impermissible poll taxes consistently held that these 
“preexisting obligation[s]” were not poll taxes.124 However, the court 
adopted a functional approach to defining taxes, focusing on whether the 
LFO raises “at least some revenue for the [g]overnment.”125 Under that 
approach, the district court found that the government imposes certain 
fees and costs solely to fund Florida’s clerks of court,126 making their 
 
 116. Id. at 814. 
 117. Daniel Rivero, Voting Rights for Hundreds of Thousands of Felons at Stake in Florida 
Trial, NPR (Apr. 27, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/27/844297011/ voting-
rights-for-hundreds-of-thousands-of-felons-at-stake-in-florida-trial [https://perma.cc/WL H6-
4ZAS]. 
 118. Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300-RH/MJF, 2020 WL 2618062, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 
24, 2020), appeal filed sub nom. Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003, 2020 WL 2618062 
(11th Cir. June 1, 2020).  
 119. Id. at *13.  
 120. Id. at *14.  
 121. Id. at *16 & n.82.  
 122. Id. at *16.  
 123. See id. at *29.  
 124. Id. at *27. 
 125. Id. (quoting NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 564 (2012)).  
 126. See id. at *28.  
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“sole or at least primary purpose [to raise] revenue . . . for government 
operations.”127  
III.  ANALYSIS 
 The judicial opinions resulting from the SB 7066 litigation represent 
a significant—and necessary—shift in the jurisprudence on the 
constitutionality of state re-enfranchisement schemes that require full 
payment of LFOs. Prior to the SB 7066 litigation, the federal courts 
entertaining challenges to these statutory schemes engaged in an almost 
mechanical analysis that virtually ensured the government’s victory. 
Courts dismissed Twenty-Fourth Amendment arguments easily, as they 
could simply explain that LFOs were not taxes but rather criminal 
penalties.128 Fourteenth Amendment challenges fared no better: if the 
plaintiffs alleged an equal protection challenge relating to wealth 
discrimination, courts would remind the plaintiffs that wealth was not a 
suspect classification and thus summarily approve of the re-
enfranchisement scheme.129 If the plaintiffs alleged a substantive due 
process challenge relating to abridgement of the right to vote, courts 
would merely cite Richardson and reiterate that felons did not have a 
fundamental right to vote.130 Without a chance of elevating judicial 
scrutiny, these challenges consistently failed after courts found no issue 
justifying the continued disenfranchisement of thousands of people under 
the deferential standard of rational basis review.  
 The Eleventh Circuit and the district court’s approaches to this issue 
present a departure from this formulaic analysis. What makes these 
opinions laudable is their recognition of the functional consequences of 
their legal decisions. By applying heightened scrutiny to SB 7066, these 
two courts recognized that the practical effect of requiring returning 
citizens to pay LFOs before restoration of their voting rights is to 
indefinitely extend the punishment of those who cannot pay. “[W]hen the 
purpose of disenfranchisement is to punish,”131 tying restoration of a 
person’s voting rights to their ability to pay effectively punishes 
indigency. The fact that the punishment is not imprisonment is irrelevant. 
As the Florida legislature itself has gone to great lengths to make clear, 
the terms of a penal sentence transcend imprisonment. All that the district 
court and the Eleventh Circuit opinions correctly note is that the U.S. 
 
 127. Id. at *29.  
 128. See supra notes 72–75 and accompanying text.  
 129. See supra notes 48–54 and accompanying text.  
 130. See supra notes 47–54 and accompanying text.  
 131. Jones v. DeSantis, 410 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1302 (N.D. Fla. 2019), aff’d sub nom. Jones 
v. Governor of Fla., 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020).  
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Supreme Court has placed constitutional limits on states’ ability to extend 
punishment based solely on an individual’s inability to pay an LFO.  
 Not only is the current resolution132 of the SB 7066 litigation the 
correct outcome under the case law, it is also justified by the 
administrative failures exposed after the full trial on the merits. The 
plaintiffs demonstrated the overwhelming difficulty returning citizens 
face when trying to determine how to satisfy their obligations.133 The 
reality is that Florida does not have a central repository of returning 
citizens’ judgments, which is often the only document reflecting the 
LFOs judges impose at sentencing.134 Records of decades-old convictions 
are often unavailable or inaccessible.135 The state does not have a 
consistent means of tracking how much money a returning citizen has 
already paid, particularly when he pays the amount directly to a victim—
as is the case for many restitution payments—or when the state has 
shifted the burden to a collection agency.136 The administrative 
difficulties were so great that at the time of the trial—eighteen months 
after the adoption of Amendment 4—the Florida State Department’s 
Division of Elections had not processed a single registration out of the 
85,000 outstanding registrations from returning citizens.137 In short, 
Florida was not “reasonably administering”138 its own pay-to-vote 
system.  
CONCLUSION 
The legal battle over Amendment 4 and SB 7066 has provided a 
crucial insight into the legacy of felon disenfranchisement. Amendment 
4 promised to do away with a punitive measure that denied many 
returning citizens a “second chance.”139 Instead, the Florida legislature 
muddied the waters by passing so-called implementing legislation that 
gutted the spirit of Amendment 4. Despite this lamentable setback, the 
litigation SB 7066 spawned has made significant progress on case law 
 
 132. See News Serv. of Fla., Court Speeds Up Voting Rights Appeal, WFSU (June 14, 2020, 
8:54 PM), https://news.wfsu.org/wfsu-local-news/2020-06-14/court-speeds-up-voting-rights-
appeal [https://perma.cc/WYB5-2FY7] (highlighting the rapid developments on this issue in 
advance of the November election). 
 133. See Jones v. DeSantis, No. 4:19cv300-RH/MJF, 2020 WL 2618062, at *16–24 (N.D. Fla. 
May 24, 2020), appeal filed sub nom. Jones v. Governor of Fla., No. 20-12003, 2020 WL 2618062 
(11th Cir. June 1, 2020). 
 134. See id. at *16.  
 135. Id. at *17. 
 136. Id. at *18–20. 
 137. See id. at *24.  
 138. Id. at *25.  
 139. Groups advocating for the passage of Amendment 4 mounted a campaign that urged 
voters to vote “yes” and give “fellow citizens a second chance.” Cf. Andrew Satter et al., Video: 
How to Get 1.4 Million New Voters, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/10/08/opinion/how-to-get-1-4-million-new-voters.html [https://perma.cc/W75N-QSYG]. 
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that has long sanctioned other discriminatory felon re-enfranchisement 
schemes. 
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